Sentient vs. Self-Aware Robot

This is a thought experiment that I've been using as an intuition pump towards the Self-Aware as valuable position.

Thought Experiment:
1) Imagine there is are two machines that can experience pleasure if it is turned on. There are currently two of these machines. One is turned on and the other has never been turned on. In fact, there is only enough power to run one at a time. Now, imagine the machine is turned off and the amount of experienced pleasure has been reduced in the world. You can now turn on either machine, does it matter which one you turn on?

2) Now, consider a second scenario. There are two machines that can experience pleasure. Not only that, but they can become aware of their own existence, conceptualize it and desire to continue being turned on. There is only enough power to run one of these machines. There is currently one of these machines running and aware of its existence. The machine is turned off. You can turn on either machine, does it matter which one you turn on?

I argue the intuitive answers to these questions is:

1) No.

2) Yes.

There is something about being aware of your existence, understanding it that gives worth to the continuation of that life.

Use in vegan-discussions
The analogous point for the non-vegan here is that if non-self aware animal's don't have the sorts of conceptual lives that self-aware animals do, then their death and replacement with another creature that can experience the world is not a concern.

Counter-Arguments
1) The answer to both questions is yes, you should always turn on the same one, regardless of the scenario.

As I'm not a moral objectivist, I don't think I can tell you that is an incorrect intuition. However, I simply don't share it. I don't see how it matters to the machine, nor do I feel a duty owned to the individual lives of these machines.

2) This is an advocation of killing non-self-aware humans!

No, it's not. It's an argument to show the insufficiency of sentience as a right to life. There are other different reasons we hold duties to our fellow humans. As I've defended this speciesist view elsewhere, I will not go into more detail. It should suffice to say that it does not logically follow that we can't hold duties to certain non-self aware beings for other reasons.

3) This doesn't apply to animals, animals are self-aware.

This discussion is far too long to go into for this article, but I will go over some of the talking points:

First, you should clarify what you mean by self-aware. Are you meaning it in the same way as I am? (Able to conceptualize and understand one's existence) or are you using another definition? I am advocating for my own definition.

Second, do you mean all animals, including worms, insects, clams? Do you mean at all ages of those animals lives? Are animals born self-aware instantly?

Now let's say you're ready to argue against my own definition and you have a set of animals you're ready to argue for. Here's my initial starting points:

1) I don't think infant humans are self-aware. I don't think we start out understanding our own existence. This seems to bear out intuitively in our memories of early childhood and through the developmental stages of human lives.

2) If I don't think infant humans are self-aware, it is unreasonable to suggest creatures with lesser cognitive capacity have a greater chance of starting with it.

3) I ascribe to a linguistic-constructivist notion of self (Or Narrative Identity, if you feel like googling), and the self requires language to be created.

4) Animals do not display the types of linguistic abilities to create a notion of self.

5) Animals do not have self-awareness.